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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Setting the stage

Interest in Third-Party Litigation Financing (“TPLF”) resurged
recently with the highly public lawsuit between Gawker Media, LLC
(“Gawker”) and Terry Bollea (more commonly known by his ring name
“Hulk Hogan”). 1 The world of litigation financing has also become
increasingly ridiculed on the heels of Peter Thiel’s admitted financing of
Hulk Hogan’s takedown of Gawker. Indeed, it was discovered that Thiel
was financing not just the Hogan lawsuit, but actually funded, or sought
to fund, other suits against Gawker as well. 2 Thiel’s message and the
media’s understandable takeaway was heard loud and clear: those who
have scrapped with the world’s billionaires should take notice.
But the world of litigation financing—considered something of a
final frontier for lucrative investment 3—could be shut down as quickly
as it is drawing attention. No doubt as Gawker enters Chapter 11
bankruptcy, businesses nationwide have likely taken notice of the
Mr. Nutini currently serves as judicial law clerk to the Honorable Edward B. Atkins in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Mr. Smith, the
Editor-in-Chief of Transactions: The Tennessee Journal of Business Law, is in the Class of
2017 at The University of Tennessee College of Law. All opinions expressed herein are
solely attributed to the authors and not to their respective institutions or employers.
The authors would also like to thank Professor George W. Kuney for his wisdom and
assistance in finalizing this piece.

*

See generally Bollea v. Gawker Media LLC, No. 12-012446-CI (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., Jun.
7, 2016); L. Gordon Crovitz, Peter Thiel’s Legal Smackdown, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2016, at
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Matthew Ingram, Gawker Bankruptcy Filing Means Peter Thiel Has Already Won,
FORTUNE, June 10, 2016, http://fortune.com/2016/06/10/gawker-bankruptcy-thiel/.
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See Sara Randazzo, Litigation Financing Attracts New Set of Investors, WALL ST. J., May 15,
2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/litigation-financing-attracts-new-set-of-investors1463348262.
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vulnerability proposed by the right litigation financed by the right
billionaire with a grudge. Will this prove to be a watershed moment that
spurs new regulation, or will it be the first blood in a new world of socalled “perfect enforcement” in which all law breaking must be
accounted for? Make no mistake, the Thiel-Gawker battle could mark
the closing of investment’s final frontier, but it is just as likely to begin a
new era of perfect civil enforcement. 4
The concept of perfect enforcement of laws is not new. Over
the past several years, the world has become increasingly familiar with
examples of perfect law enforcing technologies, such as red-light
cameras. 5 Such monitoring technologies are praised for being “more
accurate and less costly” but faulted for being more invasive and
“downright uncomfortable” to encounter. 6 These technologies are a
particular kind of enforcement: they “perfectly enforce” infractions by
way of operating under continuous surveillance or “perfect
surveillance.” 7 The act of perfect surveillance does not seek to prevent
or interfere with your violation of law; rather, the surveillance “would
detect every instance of its violation.” 8
Of course, the best part about these technologies is that they are
not universal perfect enforcement—that is, they do not yet exist
everywhere and certainly do not detect any violation of law in any form.
Another advantage is that they do not hold grudges because a system of
universal and perfect enforcement would paralyze all actors. For
example, even the youngest of generations would be guilty of such
“Perfect” law enforcement has previously been discussed in conjunction with
technology such as a stoplight and other traffic cameras. See generally Christina M.
Mulligan, Perfect Enforcement of Law: When to Limit and When to Use Technology, 14 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 13 (2008). But we envision that sufficient third-party financing of lawsuits
could hypothetically carry any civil lawsuit to trial. We refer to this idea as the concept
of “perfect civil enforcement.” Peter Thiel’s funding of Hogan’s case demonstrates
what could be the first of a new trend in attempted perfect civil enforcement of a civil
infraction that, without a grudge-holding financier, would not have been carried to its
full term.
4

5

See generally id.

6

Id. at 2.

7

Id. at 3.
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Id. at 3.
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infractions as common as speeding, consuming alcohol, pirating media,
or smoking. 9 Atonement for these common and frequent infractions
would become every man’s problem, but what if the machinery for
perfect enforcement was owned by the wealthy—by the people with the
cash to make anyone pay—financially, socially, etc.—for their
infractions? What if any of your violations of law—any simple tort for
instance—was almost certain to be enforced to the fullest extent of the
law? Moreover, what if that enforcement would be financed purely in the
hopes of a grand payout for the investors?
After the Thiel-Hogan-Gawker take-down, we could be entering
a new age of litigation financing that could amount to perfect civil
enforcement of law. Although the wealthy have always been able to carry
out a grudge by funding a lawsuit to the point of breaking an enemy, the
potential (and the incentive) for investors to finance a party’s litigation
through trial in the hopes of a payout has far greater consequences for
the actions and risks that we choose to take under the law.
This article will briefly introduce the reader to the history and
modern world of litigation financing before analyzing the effect that a
billionaire-financed lawsuit, such as Bollea v. Gawker, may have on the
burgeoning concept of perfect enforcement of civil laws. The article will
also propose policy considerations to curb the unwanted effects, if any,
of these lawsuits and to address related professional ethics concerns.
B. Bollea v. Gawker Media

On or about October 4, 2012, Gawker posted a written report
(including excerpts of the videotaped sexual encounter) about an
extramarital affair between Hulk Hogan and a woman, both of whom
were married at the time. 10 In a somewhat complex set of cases, Hulk
Hogan sued Gawker in Florida state court asserting claims for invasion
of privacy, publication of private facts, violation of the right of publicity,
and infliction of emotional distress. 11 Additionally, Hulk Hogan filed a
9

Id. at 5.

10

Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So.3d 1196, 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).

11

Id.
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motion for temporary injunction seeking to enjoin Gawker from
publishing and otherwise distributing the video excerpts and the written
report. 12 In March 2016, a Florida jury awarded Hogan a total of $140.1
million in compensatory and punitive damages. 13 Gawker’s motions for
a new trial and reduced damages were denied on May 2016 14, and on
June 10, 2016, Gawker filed a notice of appeal. 15
After news broke that Peter Thiel financially supported Hogan in
the litigation, Gawker sought leave from the court to pursue limited
discovery on the matter. 16 The judge did not rule definitively absent a
formal motion, but the judge responded negatively saying, “I don’t like
looking at all the stuff that’s published out there . . . It’s not healthy.” 17
As this case progresses through the appeals process, all eyes will be on
how high the appeals go and how strictly the courts decide to scrutinize
Thiel’s involvement as well as other issues, such as First Amendment
concerns. 18

12

Id. at 1199.

13 Debra Cassens Weiss, Will $140M Verdict for Hulk Hogan in Sex-Tape Case Survive
Appeal?, ABA JOURNAL (Mar, 21, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article

/will_115m_verdict_for_ hulk_hogan_in_sex_tape_case_survive_appeal (stating that
award included $55 million for economic injuries, $60 million for emotional distress,
and $25 million in punitive damages) (citations omitted).
Kat Sieniuc, Gawker Can’t Release More Hulk Hogan Sex Tape Footage, LAW360 (June 8,
2016),
http://www.law360.com/articles/805073/gawker-can-t-release-more-hulkhogan-sex-tape-footage.

14

15 See Gawker Media, LLC et al., v. Terry Gene Bollea, No. 2D16-2535, (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. Jun. 10, 2016) (WestLaw).
16 Eriq Gardner, Judge Upholds Hulk Hogan’s $140 Million Trial Victory Against Gawker,
THE
HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER,
May
25,
2016,
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/judge-upholds-hulk-hogans-140-897301
(detailing Gawker counsel’s request at the May 25th, 2016 hearing on a motion to
dismiss and a motion for new trial).
17

Id.

Amy
Gajda,
Privacy
vs.
Press,
SLATE
(March
21,
2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/03/what_migh
t_happen_if_the_hogan_gawker_case_reaches_the_supreme_court.html (stating “The
Hulk Hogan case could force the Supreme Court to finally draw the line between press
freedom and privacy. The press might not like it.”).

18
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The details of Mr. Thiel’s financial involvement remain largely
unclear. Mr. Thiel’s scant comments indicate that he spent roughly $10
million dollars to hire a team of lawyers to seek out plaintiffs and initiate
suits against Gawker on their behalf. 19 Hulk Hogan’s case, then, is one
of many suits brought against Gawker at the behest of Mr. Thiel
although Mr. Thiel would not speak to other cases. 20 Mr. Thiel’s animus
towards Gawker stems from a 2007 article published by the media site in
which Thiel was outed as gay. 21 It is also unclear how long Mr. Thiel has
been pursuing litigation against Gawker.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF LITIGATION FINANCING

The history of litigation financing intertwines with the doctrines
of maintenance, champerty, and barratry. 22 Black’s Law Dictionary
defines maintenance as “[i]mproper assistance in prosecuting or
defending a lawsuit given to a litigant by someone who has no bona fide
interest in the case; meddling in someone else’s litigation.” 23 Champerty
is “[a]n agreement to divide litigation proceeds between the owner of the
litigated claim and a party unrelated to the lawsuit who supports or helps
enforce the claim.” 24
Barratry means “[v]exatious incitement to
litigation, [especially] by soliciting potential legal clients” and specifically
refers to inciting baseless litigation. 25 While barratry remains barred via
professional ethics rules and various statutes against frivolous litigation, 26
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Peter Thiel, Tech Billionaire, Reveals Secret War With Gawker, N.Y.
TIMES,
May
25,
2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/business
/dealbook/peter-thiel-tech-billionaire-reveals-secret-war-with-gawker.html?hp&action
=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=second-columnregion&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0.
19

20

Id.

21

Id.

Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business Opportunity?,
30 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 485 (1992).
22

23

Maintenance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014).

24

Id.

25

Id.

See generally Nicholas Dietsch, Litigation Financing in the U.S., the U.K., and Australia:
How the Industry has Evolved in Three Countries, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 687 (2011) (giving
26
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prohibitions on maintenance and champerty have gradually eroded in the
United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States.
The doctrines of maintenance and champerty grew out of a belief
that only the courts and the litigants ought to be involved in the judicial
process. 27 Some scholars trace the existence of the doctrines of
maintenance and champerty back to ancient Greece and Rome. 28
During the Middle Ages in England, prohibitions on maintenance and
champerty arose in response to feudal lords providing maintenance for
suits involving their retainers, regardless of the suit’s merits. 29 The
English Parliament enacted various statutes prohibiting the practice
between 1275 and 1540, and it remained a tort and a crime until 1967. 30
From 1967 till 1990, maintenance and champerty agreements were
unenforceable as against public policy. 31 Further, up until 1990, the U.K.
traditionally barred contingency fee arrangements between a lawyer and a
client for the same reasons as the bar on maintenance and champerty. 32
However, in 1990, the English Parliament passed the Courts and Legal
Services Act, which made conditional fee agreements legal, 33 and since
1998, contingency fees have been permitted in all civil actions except
family law matters. 34 English courts embraced the loosening of
champerty and maintenance restrictions by reasoning that the
prohibition arising from public policy concerns must also evolve with

background for the historical development of the litigation financing industry in the
three countries).
27

Martin, supra note 22, at 487.

Id. at 486-87 (stating that “The Greeks and Romans assumed that if one maintained
an action on behalf of another, the action was either completely unfounded or too
trifling to be undertaken for any purpose other than harassing the defendant.”)
(citations omitted).

28

29

Id. at 487.

30

Id.

31

Id.; Dietsch, supra note 26, at 699.

32

Dietsch, supra note 26, at 698.

33

Id. at 698-99.

34 Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (and Legal)
Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 57, 73 (2000).
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changes in views of public policy. 35 Treatment of champerty restrictions
was highly discretionary and uncertain in England until Court of Appeal in
Arkin v. Borchard Lines Ltd. in 2005. 36 In that case, the Court of Appeal
held that third-party funding is acceptable so long as the funder does not
control litigation decisions. 37
Much like the U.K. and U.S., Australia historically prohibited
third-party litigation financing. 38 Acceptance in Australia of third-party
litigation funding began in their bankruptcy courts and gradually spread
to general civil litigation. 39 Australian courts have even gone as far as to
permit third-party funders to have broad powers to control the
litigation. 40
The United States shared the historical ban on champerty and
maintenance with the U.K. and Australia, manifested in common law,
statutory law, and public policy. 41 The reasoning behind the prohibition
in the U.S. was the same as those in the U.K. and Australia:
encouragement of frivolous litigation, harassment of defendants,
increased damages, and resistance to settlements. 42 However, the
historical prohibition received its first exception in 1908 when the
American Bar Association began allowing attorneys to collect
contingency fees. 43
Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1268, 1280-81 (2011).
35

36

Id. at 1281.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 1279.

39

Id.

Id. (citing Campbells Cash and Carry Pty. Ltd. v. Fostif Pty. Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386
(Austl.) and Mobil Oil Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Trendlen Pty. Ltd. (2006) 229 ALR 51
(Austl.)).

40

Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles, 1 DEPAUL
BUS. & COM. L.J. 85, 87 (2002).
41

42

Steinitz, supra note 35, at 1279.

43 Andrew Hananel & David Staubitz, The Ethics of Law Loans in the Post-Rancman Era, 17
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 797-98 (2004).
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Carl E. Persons made the first attempt at bona fide litigation
financing in 1976 when he attempted to raise funds for antitrust
litigation by selling shares of stock in the suit’s outcome. 44 Although
Persons’s attempt failed, others caught on to the idea, so the industry
began to develop in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 45 Reactions from the
states have been mixed, with some states like Ohio relying on the
doctrines of maintenance and champerty to invalidate litigation financing
agreements with third-parties. 46 Other states, like Massachusetts, New
Jersey, and Arizona, have been largely receptive to the practice and have
refused to enforce the doctrine of champerty. 47 Accepting litigation
finance is still relatively unresolved and developing, and some states,
such as Tennessee, have began passing statutes to better regulate the
industry. 48
III. MODERN LITIGATION FINANCING

General justifications for permitting third-party litigation
financing include: improved access to justice given the high cost of
modern litigation 49 and that other forms of financial risk sharing are

44 Yifat Shaltiel & John Cofresi, Litigation Lending for Personal Needs Act: A Regulatory
Framework to Legitimatize Third Party Litigation Finance, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 347,
347 (2004).
45

Id.

46

Dietsch, supra note 26, at 696.

47

Id. at 694.

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-16-101 (West 2014) (short title for the section is the
“Tennessee Litigation Financing Consumer Protection Act”); see also Heather Morton,
Litigation or Lawsuit Funding Transactions 2015 Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-servicesand-commerce/litigation-or-lawsuit-funding-transactions-2015-legislation.aspx
(last
visited July 24, 2016) (providing an overview of all state level litigation financing
legislation as of January 2016).
48

49 See generally Sasha Nichols, Access to Cash, Access to Court: Unlocking the Courtroom Doors
with Third-Party Litigation Finance, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 197 (2015).
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already in use such as contingency fee arrangements, 50 law suit
syndication, 51 pre-settlement funding, 52 and public interest litigation. 53
Critics of third-party litigation financing bring two general
categories of argument: historical-consequential and ethical. 54 Historical
arguments revolve around the doctrines of maintenance and champerty
and share the same concerns as those two doctrines. 55 Historical critics
argue that third-party litigation financing will encourage frivolous
lawsuits and at the same time discourage settlements. 56 Similarly,
consequentialist critics argue that litigation financing will generally cause
an increase in litigation, 57 it will encourage frivolous or speculative
litigation, and that third-party litigation funders are “tilting the scales of
justice in favor of plaintiffs at the expense of defendants.” 58 Ethical
critics argue that pre-funding evaluations may destroy attorney-client
privilege, 59 the arrangements violate the prohibition of lawyers sharing
fees with non-lawyers, 60 plaintiffs are victimized usurious loan

50 Hananel & Staubitz, supra note 43, at 797-98 (stating that contingency fee
arrangements have been allowed in the US since 1908).

Martin, supra note 22, at 498 (stating that law suit syndication began to rise in
prominence in the 1980’s).
51

Id. (stating that pre-settlement funding has been in practice since the 1980’s as well);
Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 571, 573-74 (2010).
52

53

Martin, supra note 22, at 491-92.

54

See generally Lyon, supra note 52.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 590.

58 See Joshua Richey, Tilted Scales of Justice? The Consequences of Third-Party Financing of
American Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 489 (2013).

Ani-Rae Lovell, Protecting Privilege: How Alternative Litigation Finance Supports an
Attorney’s Role, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 703 (2015).

59

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4; Martin, supra note 22, at 495; Matthew
Bogdan, The Decisionmaking Process of Funders, Attorneys, and Claimholders, 102 GEO. L.J.
197, 207 (2014).

60
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arrangements, 61 and financiers may influence the decision making
process of litigants and lawyers. 62 Many of these critiques have
engendered hot debates, but of particular concern with respect to the
Theil-Gawker-Hogan throw down are the frivolous litigation and
resistance to settlement critiques.
The litigation financier’s profit motive serves as the main rebuttal
for concerns about frivolous lawsuits and resistance to settlement. Much
like an attorney using contingency fee arrangements, a third-party
litigation financier has an incentive to not finance frivolous or
speculative litigation. If a financier backed a dubious case, he or she is
likely to lose their money. Because the financier has nothing at stake in
the litigation but their investment and the financing is typically nonrecourse, profit motive incentivizes the careful selection of only
meritorious cases. This, in fact, has been the case at the highest levels of
litigation finance. 63 At the lower levels involving small claims, the merit
of financed cases is much less clear. 64 Regardless of the sophistication of
the analysis of a plaintiff’s claim, if a lender has a profit motive, then that
profit motive incentivizes funding of meritorious claims over funding
frivolous claims.
IV. LITIGATION WITHOUT PROFIT MOTIVE
What if a litigation financier does not have a profit motive?
Does the financier even engage in litigation financing, or is it something
different?
In the media frenzy that followed news of Thiel’s
involvement with the Gawker case, attention immediately turned to the
Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in the
United States Market, 53 VILLANOVA L. REV. 83, 92 (2008).

61

62

Steinitz, supra note 35, at 1299.

For example, Bentham IMF boasts a “90% success rate.” However, that does not
include “withdrawals.” Their record is composed of 119 settlements, 13 cases won, 13
cases lost, and 35 “withdrawals.” See Our Track Record, BENTHAM IMF,
https://www.benthamimf.com/about-us/bentham-imf (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
63

John P. Barylick & Jenna Wims Hashway, Litigation Financing: Preying on Plaintiffs, 59 R.
I. BAR J. 5, 7 (2011) (stating that lenders evaluate a plaintiff’s case “by assessing: the
presence of a skilled plaintiff’s attorney; the defendant’s potential liability; in car
accident cases, the extent of damage to the vehicle; bright blood injuries; medical bills;
and a proprietary statistical analysis of jury verdicts in comparable cases.”) (citations
omitted).
64
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litigation financing industry. 65
However, the specific financial
arrangements of Thiel, a Stanford-educated attorney, are far from clear. 66
On one hand, Thiel stated, “I would underscore that I don’t expect to
make any money from this. This is not a business venture.” 67 On the
other hand, he also said, “[w]e would get in touch with plaintiffs who
otherwise would have accepted a pittance for a settlement, and they were
obviously quite happy to have this sort of support . . . . In a way very
similar to how a plaintiff’s lawyer on contingency would do it.” 68
Regardless of whether Thiel is covering his costs with the damage
awards or just pouring money into the effort with zero expectation of a
return, he is still operating without a profit motive.
Categorizing Thiel’s involvement with Gawker as “litigation
financing” has important implications for the justification of the
industry. As previously discussed, litigation financing firms’ profit
motive rebuts concerns with potentially frivolous litigation and resistance
to settlement – the motivation to reap a profit incentivizes firms to
pursue meritorious litigation and to balance the costs associated with
rejecting a settlement offer in favor of prolonging litigation. Where that
profit motive is absent, the justification falls apart. Thiel himself stated
that his purpose was to seek out plaintiffs who had claims against
Gawker 69 and enable those plaintiffs to reject low settlement offers. 70
Other protections against frivolous or unfounded litigation exist
such as Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 71 28 U.S.C.
65

Sorkin, supra note 19.

66 Executive Profile: Peter
Andreas Thiel J.D., BLOOMBERG, Aug. 2, 2016,
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=161959&
privcapId=43580005 (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
67

Sorkin, supra note 19.

68

Id.

Id. (“He funded a team of lawyers to find and help ‘victims’ of the company’s
coverage mount cases against Gawker.”).
69

Id. (“We would get in touch with plaintiffs who otherwise would have accepted a
pittance for a settlement . . . .”).

70

71

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (2016).
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§ 1927, 72 § 110 of the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers, 73 and
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 74 How often those
mechanisms of enforcement are actually used in practice is an entirely
different question that is beyond this article’s scope. For the purpose of
this piece, we will assume that all litigation being brought has some basis
that will render it non-frivolous. 75
While much of the journalistic uproar can most likely be
attributed to the subject matter of the lawsuit, 76 the significance of
Thiel’s involvement extends beyond First Amendment concerns. In the
abstract: 1) an agent; 2) with significant financial resources; 77 3) spent a
large sum of their own money; 78 4) to hire a team of lawyers to seek out
strangers with valid claims against an entity; 79 5) that the agent sought to
influence. 80 The key aspect of this situation is the abstraction of the
motive. With traditional third-party litigation finance (or with lawyers
acting on contingency fees for that matter), the party assuming the

72

28 U.S.C. § 1927.

73

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 (2000).

FED. R. CIV. P. 11.; see Erin Schiller & Jeffrey A. Wertkin, Frivolous Filings and
Vexatious Litigation, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 909, 909 (2001).

74

There are several reasons why this assumption is helpful, including the illustration
that there is cause for concern outside of frivolous litigation and assumes away the
possibility that lawyers or law firms would refuse to participate in bringing suit for fear
of court-imposed penalties.

75

Journalists and media outlets have an interest in being outraged over other journalists
and media companies getting sued for what they have published. See, e.g., Mark Joseph
Stern, Peter Thiel Is Wrong About the First Amendment, SLATE (May 26, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/05/should_pet
er_thiel_be_allowed_to_finance_hulk_hogan_s_lawsuit.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
76

As of July 22, 2016, Thiel’s personal net worth was estimated to be $2.7 billion. The
Midas List, #10 Peter Thiel, FORBES, July 22, 2016, http://www.forbes.com
/profile/peter-thiel/.

77

Sorkin, supra note 19 (stating that Thiel spent roughly $10 million financing cases
against Gawker).

78

79

Id.

Id. (stating that Thiel’s motive was “specific deterrence,” referring to Gawker outing
him, and others, as homosexual).

80
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financial risk of litigation is seeking a profitable return on their
investment. 81
In the Thiel-Gawker situation (and special interest litigation, as
discussed below), there is no profit motive. Therefore, a primary motive
is to influence the defendant in some manner. Indeed, Thiel stated that
his motive was “[l]ess about revenge and more about specific
deterrence,” referring to Gawker publicly outing him and others as
homosexual. 82 Different motives for different actors are not hard to
imagine, and this same dynamic is not new.
Financial support of litigation without the intention of financial
benefit already occurs with pro bono work, legal aid societies, law school
clinics, and public interest litigators. How different, then, is Peter Thiel,
“fund[ing] a team of lawyers to find and help ‘victims’ of the company’s
coverage mount cases against Gawker,” 83 from the likes of the ACLU
and the NAACP? 84 Further, how different are traditional litigation
financiers from the likes of Thiel and the ACLU?
The answers to those questions turn on the different motives of
each group. Public interest groups and traditional litigation financiers are
similar enough that at least one commentator suggests that a litigation
finance company could organize as a benefit corporation to fund public
interest litigation brought by the ACLUs and NAACPs of the world. 85
Another difference between traditional third-party litigation financing and Thiel is
that third-party litigation financiers do not appear to seek out clients. Rather, the
current state of the market seems to be based on litigants applying to the financiers for
funding arrangements and the financiers processing those requests. However, it is not
hard to imagine a shift in business strategy by the financier, as plaintiffs’ lawyers do
some amount of seeking out clients currently.

81

Id. (stating that Thiel also expressed other motives such as: defending those who
couldn’t defend themselves, Gawker was a “singularly terrible bully,” and
“philanthropist.”).
82

83

Id.

Special interest groups with a litigation focus are being used because they seem the
most similar to the situation with Thiel, as opposed to law school clinics or pro bono
efforts.

84

See Jason M. Wilson, Litigation Finance in the Public Interest, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 385, 389
(2014).

85
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In such an arrangement, the litigation financier would provide funding in
return for a share of the proceeds of public interest litigation, thus
helping traditionally underfunded entities. 86 The for-profit model of
“Litigation Finance in the Public Interest” ultimately runs aground with
the reality that most traditional “public interest litigation” (such as racial
discrimination or environmental claims) “emphasize[s] non-monetary
relief and symbolic victory over large damage awards.” 87 The infeasibility
of this model fleshes out the different motivations and incentives of the
two types of entities. Traditional litigation finance operates for and is
incentivized by profit whereas traditional public interest groups have a
cause for which they are fighting. Because Thiel was not seeking a
profit, his motivations more closely resemble a public interest group than
they do a traditional third-party litigation financier. Both Thiel and
public interest groups litigate without a profit motive. This makes the
initial media reaction to the Gawker case seem overblown and quick to
rope in the litigation financing industry. However, as suggested by Mr.
Wilson in Litigation Finance in the Public Interest, the worlds of litigation
finance and those seeking to litigate without a profit motive are not so
distant. 88
If more entities, either individuals or companies, take Thiel’s
lead, could we enter a new era of using litigation as a sword for
competition or personal vendettas? In this scenario, could anything less
than perfect corporate compliance with laws and regulations mean
financial ruin?
As an example in the corporate context, imagine Bank A wants
to invest $10 million. Bank A is in competition with Bank B. Bank A
knows that Bank B has recently violated a consumer protection statute
(or maybe they do not). Furthermore, last year, Bank B provided
information to a government investigation into the financial system that
was damaging to Bank A. Following Thiel’s lead, Bank A spends that
$10 million on “fund[ing] a team of lawyers to find and help ‘victims’” of
Bank B “[w]ho otherwise would have accepted a pittance for a
86

Id.

87

Id. at 422.

88

Id.
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settlement . . . .” 89 There are an unlimited number of possible iterations
of what could amount to a “hit-job:” Hedge Fund A shorts Company
B’s stock and would benefit greatly from a decline in Company B’s stock
price; Start-Up A is backed by Venture Capital firm B and is in
competition with Start-Up C; Venture Capital firm B funds a patent
infringement suit against Start-Up B.
Companies or individuals could structure their efforts in a
manner similar to political spending by forming either a benefit
corporation (actually reap profits from these hit-jobs) or a non-profit.
For example, a solar panel company (or billionaire entrepreneur-owner
of a solar panel company) could start an environmentally minded benefit
corporation that focuses on suing coal, oil, and nuclear power
companies. For example, under Delaware’s statute, “A ‘public benefit
corporation’ is a for-profit corporation organized under and subject to
the requirements of this chapter that is intended to produce a public
benefit(s) and to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner.” 90
Further, the corporation’s charter must “[i]dentify within its statement of
business or purposes . . . 1 or more specific public benefits to be
promoted by the corporation.” 91
Furthermore, these benefit
corporations would not have to be sponsored by a sole entity – they
could solicit investment from any party like any other corporation.
Fiduciary duties owed to shareholders will affect the expansion
of “hit-jobs” in the corporate context to a certain extent. For example,
consider a situation where a CEO of Company A uses company assets to
fund a third party’s litigation against a rival Company B. Is this a
decision that the board and officers make “in the ordinary course of
business,” or is this decision an extraordinary transaction that requires
shareholder approval? The answer seemingly depends on how the
hypothetical CEO pursues litigation funding.

89

Sorkin, supra note 19.

90

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (West 2015).

91

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a)(1) (West 2015).
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Delaware corporations are expressly permitted, among other
things, to “make donations for the public welfare or for charitable,
scientific or educational purposes” 92 and “[t]ransact any lawful business
which the corporation’s board of directors shall find to be in aid of
governmental authority.” 93 Corporate charitable donations are reviewed
on a standard of reasonableness, 94 and it is unclear whether or not there
must be any benefit to the donating corporation. 95 Delaware case law
“recognizes that a court may properly consider any benefit to the
corporation as an important factor when analyzing the reasonableness of
a given corporate donation.” 96 Given the low bar presented by a
“reasonableness” standard, the decision to “charitably” fund a third
party’s litigation against a rival would be difficult to challenge in court
from a shareholder’s perspective. 97
If, as discussed above, a corporation structures its funding of a
third party’s litigation against a rival as “political speech,” then it will be
even more difficult to learn about, let alone challenge, from a
shareholder’s perspective. 98 Under existing corporate law, corporate
decisions to engage in political speech are considered “ordinary business
decisions,” which is a classification that has several important
implications. 99 First, shareholders “do not have the right to vote directly
on, or to enact bylaws addressing, the ordinary business decisions of the
92

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (West 2000).

93

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(12) (West 2000).

94

Sullivan v. Hammer, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1621, 1633 (1990).

95 Steven D. Frankel, The Oracle Cases Settlement: Too Charitable to Ellison and the Plaintiffs’
Attorneys?, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 625, 639 (2006).
96

Id.

There, of course, exist other forms of action such as voting for new directors (if a
director), voting for new management, and selling the stock.

97

This article largely omits constitutional discussion of corporate political speech. See
generally Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that
the First Amendment protects corporations’ freedom to spend corporate funds on
indirect support of political candidates); James Bopp, Jr., Joseph E. La Rue & Elizabeth
M. Kosel, The Game Changer: Citizens United’s Impact on Campaign Finance Law in General
and Corporate Political Speech in Particular, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 251 (2010).
98

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124
HARV. L. REV. 83, 87 (2010).
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corporation.” 100 Second, management may make all corporate political
speech decisions; there is no requirement under current law that the
board or independent directors make such decisions. 101 Third, ordinary
business decisions do not require any special disclosures. 102 While
shareholders have a right to investigate the records of a corporation, 103
there is no guarantee a shareholder will be able to uncover a “smoking
gun.” 104
Outside of the corporate context, third-party litigation finance
has taken several different forms through crowdfunding. Much like
Peter Thiel, some crowdfunders will receive nothing in return for their
financial support, and their funding is effectively a donation. Take, for
example, the case of Sureshbhai Patel, an Indian citizen who was
allegedly injured by a police officer in Alabama and left with more than
$175,000 in hospital bills. 105 In a politically and emotionally charged
situation, crowdfunding pages started raising money for both Mr. Patel,
as well as the police officer involved, to cover their legal expenses,
among other things. 106
Other litigation crowdfunding websites promise a return for
accredited investors. 107
LexShare is a recently founded litigation
Id. (citing CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232-35 (Del.
2008)).

100

101

Id.

102

Id.
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DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West 2010).

104 Paul S. Miller, Shareholder Rights: Citizens United and Delaware Corporate Governance Law,
28 J.L. & POL. 51, 79 (2012) (describing the difficulty shareholders experience in
protecting their value in a corporation from political spending by management and the
board).
105 Jason Silverstein, Indian Man, Alabama Police Officer Who Allegedly Assaulted Him Both
Get Crowdfunding Campaigns, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Feb. 17, 2015,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/indian-man-alleged-assaultingcrowdfunding-pages-article-1.2118061.
106

Id.

107 See Securities Act of 1933, Regulation D, Rules 501, 505, and 506 (definition of and
exemption of registration for sale of securities to accredited investor).
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crowdfunding company offering a wide variety of cases to invest in and
helping potential crowdfunders with case summaries and a case progress
tracker. 108 While LexShare’s pitch seems to be return on investment,
trialfunder.com was founded as “a catalyst for change and social justice,”
specifically funding police brutality cases and promising 15% of any pay
out. 109
Even foreign companies are getting in on the rush.
Invest4Justice is a Swiss Verein, located in Geneva, Switzerland that
provides a platform to invest in lawsuits around the world, including the
United States. 110 Their website promises returns on investment ranging
from 140% to 4,166.67%. Notably, there is no requirement that
investors in lawsuits through the site be “accredited” under SEC rules. 111
The crowdfunding of lawsuits raises a different flavor of the
same concerns found with traditional third-party litigation financing as
well as some new ethical concerns that will be addressed below. For
instance, concerns about attorney-client privilege only become more
prominent the more widely dispersed information about the case
becomes. Crowdfunding inherently relies on the internet to reach a
broad base of potential funders. Websites such as LexShare must strike
a careful balance between giving investors information to make an
informed investment decision while also preserving the attorney-client
privilege. Crowdfunding litigation also raises concerns about platform
operators misleading potential investors about the merits of the case.
Even if the investors are presumed to be sophisticated, platform
operators generally take a percentage fee of successful funding
campaigns. Therefore, platform operators have an incentive to increase
the flow of funding, which could be done by overstating the merits of
the case or overstating the potential award.
Regardless of whether a dedicated third-party litigation financier,
a slighted billionaire, a corporation, or an internet “crowd” are financially
backing a litigant, all signs point to the same direction: more money
108

See https://www.lexshares.com/.

Christopher Coble, Crowdfunding Police Brutality Cases: Justice or Just a Business?,
FINDLAW (July 8, 2015), http://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/2015/07/crowdfundingpolice-brutality-cases-justice-or-just-a-business.html (last visited July 27, 2016).
109
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See https://invest4justice.com/terms-use/.
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See https://invest4justice.com/campaigns/.
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being poured into litigation that could service any number of
motivations. While some of these funding sources have a profit motive
to incentivize backing of meritorious cases and efficient settlements,
others do not. Are the financiers lacking a profit motive a good or bad
thing for our legal system? Are they simply enforcing the law as it is
written via private means? Or are these actors showing the wisdom of
the age-old doctrines of maintenance and champerty?
V. CURBING PERFECT CIVIL ENFORCEMENT; OR, NEW ETHICAL
QUESTIONS POSED BY GAWKER-LIKE LITIGATION FINANCING

If you buy that Thiel-Gawker-like litigation financing is here to
stay, the most obvious response from the legal sector will be to define
what sort of regulations or limitations would be necessary to curb any
undesirable traits of that type of third-party enforcement of laws. For
legal ethicists, the question will be more prescriptive and normative:
should we want to curb the new perfect civil enforcement market, and if
so, how? Generally speaking, if this type of enforcement is a watershed
moment for our legal economy, what do we want that economy to look
like in the years ahead? An even more incisive question is, to paraphrase
L. Gordon Crovitz’s similar question in the The Wall Street Journal in June
2016: what happens if the wealthy can fund lawsuits to bankrupt
companies they dislike?112
As we have already noted, Peter Thiel may have answered the
question for the billionaire class: “[the Gawker suit was] less about
revenge and more about specific deterrence.” 113 Apparently, one of his
underlying motives was that he wanted to stop Gawker because he
regarded the media company as a “bully” and a “bad actor” in the field
of journalism, publishing scandalous details without a social
conscience. 114 In other words, Thiel hoped to finance a message to other
media companies: do not mess with our personal lives. Of course, “our”
must necessarily mean “members of my billionaire or millionaire class”
112

Crovitz, supra note 1, at A15.

113

Id.

114

Ingram, supra note 2.
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largely because no one else could fund such litigation based on their
singular motive. Thiel was effectively sending a message that could be—
and likely was—heard loud and clear by all businesses, not just media
companies.
But was Thiel truly seeking public justice in the vein of the 1960s
public interest litigation model? 115 Or was he merely seeking to impose
his will on a market he disliked to seek profits—whether personal or
financial? With the backdrop of maintenance being de-criminalized
decades ago, perhaps Thiel, in a way, continued that public interest effort
so that “bully” media companies like Gawker may either stop intruding
upon the private lives of public personalities or simply stop profiting off
of scandalous information.
If perfect civil enforcement becomes the deterrence that Thiel
hopes for, many companies and individuals will demand the creation of a
regulated space for such enforcement. In the same way that campaign
finance regulation has drawn intense scrutiny, the next stage of regulated
modern litigation finance will be born. What will it look like? What
should it look like?
A. The Ethical Question of Perfect Civil Enforcement

When he described maintenance, whose de-criminalization
birthed the modern litigation finance movement, 116 Sir William
Blackstone wrote that it was “an offense against public justice, as it keeps
alive strife and contention and perverts the remedial process of the law
into an engine of oppression.” 117 That is, he noted that the prospect of
engaging in litigation financing was an ethical question. As far back as
1850, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that “many acts [that] were
adjudged to be maintenance [again, at the time, largely illegal] . . . have
long since ceased to be regarded as morally or legally censurable.” 118
With Thiel’s high-profile actions against Gawker, have we, as a society,
115

See supra note 82-83.

116

See generally supra Part II.

117 Sherley v. Riggs, 30 Tenn. 53, 54 (1850) (citing 4 Bla. Com. 135); see also Crovitz,
supra note 1, at A15.
118

Riggs, 30 Tenn. at 54 (quoting Campbell v. Jones, 4 Wend. 310).
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pivoted once again? Those wary of a new age of Thiel-inspired hit jobs
may request a return of illegal maintenance. The legal and ethical
questions are important and made all the more dire by the stakes
underlying cases like Hogan’s. Recently, Fortune magazine echoed the
worried sentiments felt by many when it posed the following question to
its readers:
What if Peter Thiel or some other wealthy individuals
decide that they don’t like the reporting that the New
York Times has been doing on Syria or gun control or
marriage equality? There’s no reason to think this kind of
behavior will be restricted to media outlets that we can all
agree are reprehensible in some way—the exact same
machinery could be used against any media entity, and
their only defense would be to have their own billionaire
to fight back. 119
This logic is a perfectly understandable extension of thought on the
fallout from Thiel’s actions, and it may prophesy what will occur in the
market.
A pivot in the litigation finance market will require a new
prescriptive discussion on the regulations, if any, that should accompany
such a disruptive tactic. Specifically, any new set of rules and regulations
intended to preserve the beneficial aspects of the litigation finance
market while also ameliorating market turmoil will need to focus on a
new legal ethic surrounding the concept of perfect civil enforcement.
For example, some free market camps may champion the de-regulated
nature of litigation finance as an investment or strategic tool; meanwhile,
opponents of Thiel-like litigation finance decry its effects on companies’
free speech. 120 Looking to history, a revised and modern theory of
maintenance could inform the way we consider the ethical implications
of litigation financing.

119

Ingram, supra note 2.

120

See id.

190

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 18

But, as will be discussed below, the ethical questions have a new
focus after the Thiel-Gawker takedown. Where once the typical
regulation of litigation finance protected the unwitting consumer from
predatory financiers, the Gawker lawsuit prompts questions about
protecting the market or the businesses themselves from unknown
financing on the opposite side. This is, we argue, a completely new way
of looking at the ethics of litigation finance and its effects on the market
vis-a-vis a need for regulation.
The new ethical question posed by perfect civil enforcement
could first be framed, in our view, in the same vein as the limitations we
place on malicious prosecutions. In common law, we generally deem
prosecutions “malicious” when a civil or criminal prosecutorial team,
armed with discretion, intentionally and maliciously institutes or pursues
legal action without adequate justification or for an improper purpose.
Malicious prosecutions may be brought in civil or criminal matters. 121
For example, in malicious criminal prosecutions, actions may be
dismissed as malicious when they are egregiously brought without the
requisite probable cause. Under Tennessee law, in order to establish
malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that “(1) the defendant had
instituted a prior suit or judicial proceeding without probable cause, (2)
the defendant brought such prior action with malice, and (3) the prior
action was finally terminated in plaintiff’s favor.” 122 Successful malicious
prosecution actions can award financial compensatory penalties to the
plaintiff, and they are subject to a one-year statute of limitations similar
to other personal torts. 123
But by their nature and given the elements that must be proved,
malicious prosecution actions may come too late to alleviate concerns of
perfect civil enforcement. Businesses that wish to strike back against
unwarranted litigation financed by third parties could file malicious
prosecution actions, but they would have needed to succeed in the
John Day, Essential Elements of a Malicious Prosecution Claim in Tennessee, DAY ON
TORTS, http://www.dayontorts.com/miscellaneous-essential-elements-of-a-maliciousprosecution-claim-in-tennessee.html (last visited July 18, 2016).
121

122 Himmelfarb v. Allain, 380 S.W.3d 35, 38 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Christian v. Lapidus,
833 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tenn. 1992)).
123

TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104(a)(1) (West 2015).
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lawsuit and discover who, in fact, had financed the plaintiff’s suit.
Beyond the timing issues, this is a high barrier to entry.
With regard to the Thiel-Gawker battle, the malicious
prosecution approach is particularly problematic. First of all, Gawker
lost without knowing who was financially backing the suit. Secondly,
Gawker’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition was filed June 10, 2016, and
thus the effects of Hogan’s massive judgment were felt almost
instantly. 124 According to some estimations and based on the lead bid
for Gawker’s court-mandated auction, Thiel’s actions reduced Gawker’s
value to $100 million from valuations as high as $250 million prior to the
Hogan suit. 125
Thus, in a sense, the ship went down almost
126
There was certainly no time for successful filing and
immediately.
decision on a malicious prosecution action; Florida—the state where the
Hogan action was based—has malicious prosecution elements akin to
Tennessee’s. 127 If a business tanks within weeks of a malicious judgment
and its assets are sold at auction (as Gawker intends to do in Chapter
11), subsequent litigation would not be able to stop the momentum and
spirit upon which the market bases its valuations. That is, the price
investors are willing to pay for a tarnished company will drop
precipitously, and the thought of correction through litigation will likely
not recover that lost value. Gawker lost its value in investors’ minds
when it lost the Hogan case. Therefore, when we speak of what can be
done to curb or limit the effects of perfect civil enforcement, perhaps
subsequent litigation is not the answer as it would be in wrongful
prosecutions. Wrongful prosecution litigation would not address the
realities of modern litigation financed as displayed in the Gawker lawsuit.
B. What Can Be Done to Curb the Effects of Perfect Civil Enforcement, If Not
Subsequent Litigation?

124

In re Gawker Media, LLC, 16-11700-smb, at Docket No. 1 (June 10, 2016).
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Clearly, if subsequent corrective malicious prosecution litigation
is inadequate to save a precipitous drop in value or complete bankruptcy
of a tarnished company, then proactive and protective measures must be
installed to ward off unwarranted market upheaval caused by litigation
financing. Perhaps, then, statutes and regulations are the answer. But
several questions arise under that scenario. For example, can regulations
prove effective at curbing the unwanted effects of litigation financed by
bad actors? How would those regulations define the bad actors from
those protecting legitimate rights or interests?
At least in Tennessee, one of the first of several states to regulate
litigation finance, 128 consumer litigation financing has been regulated
since 2014. 129 Although a full discussion of the law is outside the scope
of this article, the Tennessee Litigation Financing Consumer Protection
Act “imposes price controls and other measures on lenders that provide
financial assistance to consumers while they pursue legal settlements.” 130
For example, the law requires litigation financiers to register in
Tennessee, pay an associated filing fee, and post a surety bond of
$50,000. 131 As added protection, it caps the fees the firm may charge,
and consumers may also rescind the deal under certain circumstances.
Writing for the United States Chamber Institute for Legal
Reform, Lisa A. Rickard wrote in 2014 that the state of Tennessee
should be lauded for “enact[ing] strong safeguards around a practice that
shortchanges injured consumers, increases litigation costs, and crowds
court dockets.” 132 This is, of course, in strong contrast to advocates of
litigation finance that feel the funding practice permits more promising
Victoria Shannon, Third-Party Litigation Funding and the Dodd-Frank Act, 16 TENN. J.
BUS. L. 15, 18 n. 19 (2014).
128

Andrew G. Simpson, Litigation Financing Firm Exits Tennessee As New Law Goes Into
Effect, INS. J. (July 3, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
129

southeast/2014/07/03/333772.htm (last visited July 20, 2016).
130
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plaintiffs access to the courthouse,. 133 but these laws have a different
focus than that which is needed to curb Thiel-like hit jobs. Prior to it
going into effect in July 2014, it was clear that the Tennessee consumer
protection law was enacted with an eye toward the ethical implications of
unchecked litigation finance on the consumer-plaintiff, not the market or
businesses.
Regulations like Tennessee’s are meant to protect unwitting
consumers from predatory practices. These regulations hope that
plaintiffs in need of strong financial backing do not give up the vast
majority of the relief sought just because the case was financed by a third
party. As noted above, current regulations address the ethical questions
surrounding third party financiers preying on consumer-plaintiffs. This
is a wholly different question than the question of how we can address
ethical questions surrounding the effects of that litigation financing on
the market and on businesses like Gawker who may be devastated by the
right lawsuit.
C. The Thiel-Gawker Feud Marks an Important Shift in the Ethical Focus of Any
Litigation Finance Regulation

The Gawker takedown markedly shifts our view of who might be
the victim in cases that are financed by third parties. In Hogan’s case
specifically, his lawsuit was bankrolled by $10 million of Thiel’s personal
funds simply as a “deterrence” tactic. 134 Thiel did not want to dupe
Hogan; he wanted to prove a point about media companies like
Gawker. 135 Although it is unclear whether Thiel financially profited from
the lawsuit, 136 Hogan was not put at risk by having his case financed,

133

See Nichols, supra note 49.
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See Crovitz, supra note 1, at A15.
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See id.
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Sorkin, supra note 19. Sorkin wrote that:
Without revealing an exact figure, [Thiel] said that estimates of $10
million in expenses so far were “roughly in the ballpark.” [Thiel]
added: “I would underscore that I don’t expect to make any money
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which distinguishes him from the sort of unwitting plaintiffs the
Tennessee laws hope to protect. Indeed, Gawker was the party
victimized in a way by the unknown financing; they were the party who
would have profited from the existence of some form of regulation, not
Hogan. The ethical focus of any litigation finance regulation, then, has
shifted because of the Thiel-Gawker lawsuit.
So what type of laws and regulations would be effective? The
ethical approach underlying regulations like those that exist to protect
Tennessee consumers is far from and perhaps difficult to analogize when
seeking to protect the market and the rights of businesses from a
billionaire with a grudge. Public or privately held companies that may
have strong valuations like Gawker are ostensibly sophisticated and
arguably do not need regulations that, by protecting plaintiffs acting
against them, protect the company itself. Hogan certainly did not need
regulations’ protection if Thiel, his financier, was only looking to get paid
in revenge and future deterrence.
However, the purpose underlying present litigation finance
regulations are not totally unhelpful.
Despite Gawker being
sophisticated enough to understand or pay for a proper legal defense,
they may find themselves as unwitting as the consumers that state laws
currently protect. As we now know, Thiel did not disclose his backing
of the Hogan lawsuit until after the massive judgment had been
awarded; 137 by the same token, Gawker could not know that revenge was
on the table during settlement discussions. Gawker, at the time, only
had a suspicion that someone in Silicon Valley was financing the

from this. This is not a business venture.” He would not say whether
he had compensated any of the people, including Mr. Bollea, which
could raise questions in an appeal.
Id. Knowing that Thiel is a Stanford-educated lawyer, his eyes are probably
wide open to conflict of interest issues and therefore likely chose his words
carefully.
Id.; see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer-turned-entrepreneur admits he financed Hulk
Hogan’s Gawker suit, ABA JOURNAL (May 26, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/news
/article/lawyer_turned_entrepreneur_admits_had_financed_hulk_hogans_gawker_suit
(last visited July 20, 2016).
137
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litigation. 138 For what it is worth, Hogan himself had never mentioned a
third-party backer. 139 Thus, Gawker could cry foul because it remained
ignorant and unwitting until the close of the suit. That is, it did not
know how much of a victim it was until it was too late. In relation to
timing, we have already demonstrated how subsequent malicious
prosecution litigation is not an effective answer for Thiel-like takedowns.
Consequently, if laws or regulations are the answer to protecting
company takedowns by private financiers holding grudges, then those
laws and regulations must enter the fray as early in the litigation as
possible. To put it another way, any efforts to curb unintended market
consequences on funded lawsuits must come well before the target
companies’ value hits the rocks.
D. Some Suggestions to Mold Any Proposed Laws or Regulations

Because the ethical questions—and indeed, the motivations of
the parties—underlying Gawker, like deterrence or revenge litigation,
provide a novel understanding of who requires protection, new
regulations must be borne with a unique reach. Again, litigation finance
regulations protect the consumer-plaintiffs who sign on with third
parties for financing of their promising suits. Here, the market may view
the defendant, Gawker Media, as the victim of litigation finance. By
some accounts, shapeless entities such as free speech and the market as a
whole may ultimately be victimized by the onset of Thiel-like financing.
If any target business’s civil errors will be noticed and potentially litigated
(what we have here termed “perfect civil enforcement”) by targeting
billionaires, company after company could be knocked into bankruptcy.
Taking a nuanced view of the needs of these companies (and the
individuals owning and/or running them), we offer a few suggestions to

Andrew Ross Sorkin, Gawker Founder Suspects a Common Financer Behind Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES,
May
23,
2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/business/
dealbook/gawker-founder-suspects-a-common-financer-behind-lawsuits.html.
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consider when proposing laws or regulations to address these novel
fears.
First, although the concept of who may be victimized or require
protective regulations has shifted, consumers are still in need of
protection. Unwitting consumer-plaintiffs will continue to require
protection from predatory third-party financing even in a climate of fear
for businesses like Gawker. Consumer protection laws like Tennessee’s
should be maintained and enriched alongside any proposed regulation of
business-defendant-focused scenarios.
Second, a regulation requiring disclosure of the third-party
backer would not be burdensome. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 7.1, federal litigation already requires as a standard disclosure
the existence of ownership of a company’s stock before the case
progresses. 140 If used in all litigation financing scenarios, requiring a
similar type of disclosure has many benefits beyond simply keeping the
courts informed about the parties. For example, disclosing the thirdparty financier would allow all parties to properly account for interests in
settlement negotiations. As has been reported, Gawker was never aware
of Thiel’s interests in its settlement negotiations; thus, it could not have
proposed a remedy that would assuage Thiel’s concerns. 141 A proposed
regulation requiring disclosure could be founded on a percentage basis; if
the plaintiff expects that a certain percentage, say 15% or more, will be
funded by outside financiers, then the names of those financiers must be
disclosed at the outset of the litigation. 142 However, if such proposed
140 See FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1 (requiring the filing of a disclosure statement in federal
litigation by a nongovernmental corporate party to inform the court with a filing that
“(1) identifies any parent corporation and any publicly held corporation owning 10% or
more of its stock; or (2) states that there is no such corporation.”); id. at 7.1(a) (The
party also has a duty to supplement this information if anything changes.); see also FED.
R. CIV. P. 7.1(b)(2).
141

See Crovitz, supra note 1, at A15.

142 This could operate much the same way as disclosures under Rule 7.1. Although the
philosophical implications are unclear at this early juncture, the percentage of interest
surrounding the third-party financiers could be used to affect the plaintiff’s standing. If
he did not have over a 50%, say, financial interest in the litigation, questions would arise
under justiciability doctrines. For example, would his injury be truly traceable to the
defendant? Is it his injury that will be redressed by a favorable decision? Without proper
standing, of course, the court would lack subject matter jurisdiction in the matter. See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
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quantitative line-drawing would be viewed as encouraging financiers to
find ways to game the system, mandatory full disclosure of any
interest—direct or indirect—may be required.
To remedy financiers entering litigation at an opportune time—
such as when they offer to fund a suit after discovery when the
likelihood of success is better estimated—the plaintiff will, as in Rule 7.1,
have a continuing duty to disclose the existence of any such agreements
or what percentage of the litigation costs (or exact amounts) they expect
outside sources will pay. 143 Failure to disclose or ignoring the continuing
duty to update the court as to a plaintiff’s funding could be sanctionable
like a Rule 11 violation. 144
Third, if disclosure (whether full or on some other quantitative
basis) of a plaintiff’s financiers is viewed as too burdensome, a law
allowing a flexible standard for the court to apply could be implemented.
For example, to lessen disagreements on whether certain quantitative
limits require disclosure of a plaintiff’s financing, courts could utilize a
more qualitative “compelling interest” approach. By that standard, upon
motion by a suspicious party or sua sponte, a court could review materials
underlying plaintiff’s funding of the lawsuit at hand to determine
whether a non-party’s compelling interest was present that was not
disclosed. If the plaintiff’s ability to settle or make other ends-based
decisions was significantly affected by the third-party financier(s), the
court could call for their explicit disclosure to all parties.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1(b) (requiring that the disclosure statement be “promptly”
supplemented if anything changes).
143

See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. It is also noteworthy in recognizing the potential analogy to
the discussion here that the disclosures required under Rule 7.1 (along with the
continuing duty to supplement that disclosure should circumstances change) are
inspired by the need to disclose conflicts of interest relevant to judges, such as the
financial interests disclosed pursuant to Canon 3C(1)(c) of the Judicial Code of
Conduct. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1, Committee Notes; see also FED. R. APP. P. 26.1
(requiring corporate disclosure statements for the same reasons at the federal appellate
level). The same types of disclosures of relevant litigation financing information can
reveal the financial conflicts of interest present in parties’ litigation strategies. The
disclosures in the litigation financing scenario would be likewise minimal and as
unburdensome as the Rule 7.1 disclosures are today.
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Alternatively, laws or regulations requiring disclosure on a
quantitative basis could accompany a law permitting the courts to review
the amount of financing as creating (or not creating) a compelling
interest outside of those presented by the plaintiff. For example, in
reference to Hogan’s case against Gawker, if his interests were not
compatible with Thiel’s, and if Hogan did not have deterrence or
revenge in mind, then a separate and compelling interest was present in
the lawsuit. Hogan would then be required to disclose those interests.
In theory, the defendant could be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
the matter to call witnesses and determine the extent of a third-party
financier’s effect on a lawsuit. At the very least, the defendant would be
able to connect the dots and estimate all of the interests underlying the
parties’ positions. Such knowledge would, at a minimum, facilitate
meaningful settlement negotiations.
Of course, the downside to these proposed qualitative tests being
administered by the courts is the “fuzziness” of such a standard and the
fact that it would create additional and ancillary work for the courts
beyond the needs of the underlying litigation itself. Undoubtedly, a body
of case law would develop around one of these qualitative standards,
which would needlessly complicate otherwise typical litigation. And,
practically speaking, the judiciary—which is already burdened with
crowded dockets—would likely roll its eyes at constantly administering
separate rulings on a flexible standard to avoid unwanted abuses in
litigation financing scenarios. These concerns would therefore embolden
support for a full, unqualified disclosure rule in litigation financing, in
which complete disclosure would be required of any financier with a
direct or indirect interest in the lawsuit or the lawsuit’s proceeds. Such
all-out disclosure should also include disclosure of anyone supplying,
directly or indirectly, funding to cover any of the costs of litigation,
including attorneys’ fees.
No matter the law built to identify it, disclosure of financiers is
key because it is now clear that the Gawker case has demonstrated the
importance of knowing the financial backing of opponents. When a
business’s survival is at risk, simple disclosure of any third-party
financiers does not seem unduly burdensome, especially given that so
many regulations and professional responsibility rules militate against
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conflicts of interest. However, consideration of the need for these
regulations will undoubtedly create heated debate. Does Main Street
care about the disclosure of litigation financiers? Would Americans
believe that a large, valuable, sophisticated media company like Gawker
is a “victim” in need of protective laws and regulations? What if a team
of billionaires decided to take down PepsiCo in a class action suit that
arose and refused all settlement offers along the way? In a burgeoning
era of the ability of the wealthy to finance any suit against powerful
companies, the age of perfect civil enforcement could be here to stay.
Overall, these policy discussions create the larger question:
should we even seek to, and can Americans stomach, the protection of
these companies in the first place? This ethical, political, and economic
question was drawn into the public discourse during the recent Great
Recession when “too big to fail” banks were “bailed out” with
government (or, more precisely, taxpayer) funds. Should we expect
more of the same to create a preemptive safety net and a more
hospitable litigation environment for companies like Gawker? That
question, although equally compelling, will have to wait for subsequent
articles to explore implications of the market as the future of modern
litigation finance vis-à-vis perfect civil enforcement continues to unfold.
VI. CONCLUSION

The case of Gawker Media v. Bollea may present a watershed
moment in the development of modern litigation financing. Peter Thiel
played a public interest group by financially backing another plaintiff’s
case without any incentive to profit from his investment. However, the
third-party litigation financing industry got caught in the fray and now
faces new scrutiny. The ease with which these two were confused shows
exactly how muddy the waters have become where third parties get
financially involved in others’ litigation. The issues and concerns
presented largely depend on the specific manifestation whether it be a
dedicated third-party litigation financier (either sophisticated or not), a
slighted billionaire, a corporation, or an internet “crowd.”
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At the very least, Thiel’s lawsuit financing brings to the fore
various new policy questions about third-party interests in litigation
moving forward. As we have discussed in this article, among those
questions are the financing’s implications for free speech, shifting
incentives away from profits, professional responsibility, and ethical
dilemmas surrounding the shift in entities being viewed as potentially
victimized by wealthy financiers. Where possible, we have presented
policy discussions and proposals should regulation be needed of this
practice, which we believe could be termed a new age of “perfect civil
enforcement” of the law. Only time will tell whether these novel legal
and policy questions will permit a new market where any entity’s mishaps
can be perfectly enforced by the likes of wealthy financiers with
questionable or unknown motives.

